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We are used to expect better and more from our computers, but for a very large number of tasks no amount of 
money, time or ingenuity will ever be sufficient to build the right machine. Consider the history of flight. Given 
our present understanding of physics, we know that nothing can fly faster than light. Computers have 
comparable constraints. The topic is fascinating and full of important consequences. It is also technically 
complex, but David Harel has provided an excellent introduction.  
Imagine an ideal computer within a prison. The first wall is the conceptually Incomputable. A robot 
cannot tide up a messy room or learn how to translate Homer because these tasks cannot be transformed into 
algorithms, the only sort of logical recipe that a computer can follow. Digital agents cannot acquire experience 
and common-sense, and this is why any strong programme in Artificial Intelligence is doomed to fail. The 
second wall is the logically Undecidable. A few mathematical theorems prove that a number of computational 
problems have no solution, regardless of the resources available to any ideal computer. Remember the Y2K 
problem? It was caused by human shortsight, and it had to be solved by human efforts. It is impossible to build 
a universal software verifier, which can automatically and fully evaluate whether a given program solves a given 
algorithm problem, for any program and algorithm we wish to test. Programming and testing software for 
correctness are empirical tasks that have to be left to engineers. The third wall is the physically Intractable. 
Some algorithmic problems are computable only in theory. In practice, they would require more time than the 
life of the universe, and more recording space than all its particles. Chess is, computationally speaking, 
intractable. Deep Blue does not play like a grand master. It can win against the world chess champion because 
it relies on rules of thumb and million of games and matches studied and played by generations of players. 
Playing against it is a bit like playing trivial pursuit against the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The fourth wall is not 
discussed in Harel’s book, but it is equally constraining. It is the economically Unaffordable. Civilian airplanes 
could easily fly at the speed of sound but they don’t for economic reasons, and the Concorde remains an 
exception. The same logic governs the development of ICT (information and communication technology). For 
example, chips made using gallium arsenide are much faster than silicon chips, but they are too expensive to 
manufacture and too dangerous to handle (arsenic is very toxic), hence their use is limited to special 
applications. Some computational tasks will remain forever too expensive, and not just for the general user. 
As Harel shows in the second part of the book, the Undecidable is a logical wall that will never fall or 
move, and ingenuity aided by parallel, quantum, probabilistic or molecular computing could only help to shift 
the other three walls an inch or two. The prison can become slightly less claustrophobic, but it is there to stay. 
All this, however, is bad but hardly unexpected news. The limits of our computers are a direct consequence of 
the mathematical constraints inherent to classic computation, and these were already known before any PC 
was built. And yet, Harel stresses that even many members of the computing profession are unaware of these 
crucial issues. The problem lies in those philosophical arguments that he seems to dismiss as “quasi-scientific”. 
Public resources could be spent more efficiently and scientific efforts could be addressed more accurately if 
there were a more sound conceptual approach to what computers can really do and how they affect our 
environment. Instead, the implicit tendency is often to reduce the doable to the “computable”. Harel 
acknowledges the risk but seems to fall into the same trap when he argues, for example, that “the limits of 
computation are the limits of knowledge”. He reduces knowledge to what is deducible from facts, and the 
latter to what can be computed from facts algorithmically, but the reduction is flawed because it relies on a 
fundamental ambiguity. “Deducible from facts” can only mean “generally based on facts” in connection with 
the concept of knowledge, but it must mean “correctly inferred from premises according to mathematical logic” 
in connection with computation. Human and artificial agents do not share the same constraints, not least 
because we know this but they cannot. Harel is then right in arguing that showing the limits of our computers 
means discouraging futile efforts and encouraging the development of new paradigms. And his book is an 
excellent antidote. But this is not enough. To make sure that the computational prison does not become our 
own we also need to develop a better philosophy of computing and ICT, which may provide a foundational 
investigation into the nature of information and its dynamics (including computation), and guide us in 
understanding and solving the conceptual as well as normative issues involved in the constitution of our 
information environments. 
